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Abstract 
 
We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately 
placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior 
to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt 
issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is 
suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. 
We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the 
financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. 
Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans 
have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms. 
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1. Introduction 
For the largest companies in the UK, debt financing is from three primary sources: 
public bond markets, banks and privately placed debt markets. Yet the UK public bond 
market has been described as “underdeveloped” in comparison to US markets in a 
government report, citing evidence that the number of UK corporate bond and privately 
placed debt issues is comparatively lower than in other developed capital markets (Breedon, 
2012). As a result, UK firms have historically placed a greater reliance on banks as their main 
source of borrowing. However, following the global financial crisis of 2008, there has been a 
widely documented decrease in access to bank finance as banks tightened their lending 
requirements.1 As a direct result of this contraction in bank lending, UK companies have 
turned more frequently to public and privately placed debt markets to meet their borrowing 
needs.2  
In this paper we analyze the stock market response to public, bank and privately 
placed debt issuance for a sample of 1,537 announcements made by UK non-financial and 
non-utility firms listed on the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 
2001 and 2013. Public bonds are identified as any exchange registered bond instruments. 
Using the same procedure as in Marshall et al. (2016) we identify bank debt as loan facilities 
explicitly identified as borrowings from a bank institution and privately placed debt as 
issuances of debt from private investors that are not identified as banks, such as insurance 
firms, pension funds, and other private investor groups.  
Differences in the importance of individual lending sources for UK firms, in 
comparison to US markets, and the documented change in debt financing patterns over our 
                                                          
1 The Bank of England (2013) highlights that over the period January 2003 to December 2007; UK companies 
raised funds totalling £528.3bn through syndicated bank loans, but only £342.6bn was raised between January 
2008 and December 2012. Adrian et al. (2012) document similar evidence for US borrowers. 
2 Average annual gross bond issuance by UK companies more than doubled from £20.6bn to £45.2bn between 
2003 and 2007 (Bank of England, 2015). Similarly, issuance of privately placed debt by UK companies in US 
private placement markets almost doubled from £53.8bn to £91.6bn (International Financial Law Review, 
2013). 
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sample period motivates us to examine how the stock market responds to announcements of 
borrowing from the different sources of debt finance available to UK companies, and to 
examine how the stock price response has changed surrounding the 2008 financial crisis.  
A number of theoretical models argue that private debt has advantages over public 
debt. For example, banks can provide additional financial services to their clients and also 
have superior monitoring, screening, insurance and certification functions (Nakamura, 1993). 
Signalling models emphasize that if banks are privy to inside information through bank 
lending activities, they would not offer or renew a loan to a borrower if they discover 
unfavourable information on the firm (Bernanke, 1983; Fama, 1985). This superior ex-ante 
certification and ex-post monitoring of borrower companies by lending banks should 
engender a more positive stock price response to debt issuance announcements from this 
source. Consistent with this, the stock price response to bank debt issuance has been found to 
be generally positive (Billett et al., 1995; James, 1987), close to zero for issues of public debt 
(Hadlock and James, 2002; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986), and is mixed for privately placed 
debt issuance (Chandra and Nayar, 2008; James, 1987).  
The more positive response to announcements of bank debt by corporate borrowers 
has often been attributed to these “special” characteristics of bank lending. However, given 
changes in borrowing trends for UK firms surrounding the crisis: restricted access to bank 
credit, increased importance for syndicated over bilateral bank loans, and the growing 
importance of public and privately placed debt, we propose that the stock price response to 
corporate borrowing announcements has changed surrounding the crisis. On the one hand, the 
monitoring benefits of bank debt may have increased during the crisis given restricted access 
to borrowing, leading to a more positive stock price response. Alternatively, if bank lending 
is granted on onerous terms during the crisis, the high cost of obtaining finance will lead to a 
lower stock price response to loan announcements. 
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Consistent with theories of relationship lending, for our full sample we find 
significant and positive announcement returns to bank loans, and no evidence of abnormal 
returns surrounding public and privately placed debt issuance. To gain further insight, we 
split our bank loan sample based on the number of lenders, and we find the positive market 
response to bank loans is driven by syndicated loans rather than the more traditional bilateral 
loans. This finding is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal 
of the creditworthiness of the borrowing company.  
Further, we find that positive announcement returns to bank loans are driven by issues 
made prior to the global financial crisis. Stock price returns to bank loan announcements are 
significantly lower from 2008 onwards. This less favourable market reaction can be 
explained by credibility problems in the banking system post financial crisis and the clear ex-
post evidence that bank lending decisions made in the period prior to the crisis were poor on 
average. In general, our finding highlights that bank loans may no longer generate their 
expected creditworthiness signalling advantages for borrowing firms, often labelled as 
making bank loans “special” in the literature on corporate borrowing source. 
We contribute to literature on the market response to debt issuance announcements in 
two main ways. First, as our sample period encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008 
we can examine how the market views the announcement of debt offerings from public, bank 
and privately placed sources during a period where firms suffered restricted access to bank 
credit. Our findings highlight that the positive effects of accessing bank loans for borrowing 
firms vary with market conditions, availability of credit and the potential monitoring strength 
of the lending institution. 
Second, we extend prior US literature on the market response to debt source 
announcements to the UK market. We argue that a UK single country study is interesting for 
several reasons. As described previously, bank loans to UK companies are more important 
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than bank loans to US companies as a source of debt finance. Moreover, the lack of 
developed public bond markets make syndicated loans in the UK an important source of 
borrowing. Bank of England reports (2009, 2012) show an increase in provision of lending 
through syndicated bank loans in recent years and to the detriment of traditional bilateral 
loans. Also, the UK private placement market is an underdeveloped market in contrast to the 
established private placement market in the US, which has been a historically important 
source of debt finance for US companies (Breedon, 2012; Slaughter and May, 2014). To date, 
Armitage’s (1995) analysis of syndicated loans has been, to our knowledge, the only study to 
provide a systematic analysis of the stock market response to debt issuance classified by 
borrowing source in a UK setting.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior 
literature on the market response to debt issuance and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 
outlines our sample construction and empirical testing. We present our results in Section 4 
and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Market reaction to debt issues  
Theoretical research illustrates that the monitoring and screening services provided by 
banks help to reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, endorsing 
firm quality, and signalling creditworthiness to outside investors. Diamond (1984) and 
Gomes and Phillips (2012) argue that, ex ante, banks are better positioned to make informed 
decisions regarding a borrower’s credit quality in comparison to other private and public 
lenders. Banks acquire proprietary information in the process of repeat lending and provision 
of other banking activities, such as the firm’s deposit history, that is unavailable to outside 
lenders. Having built up expertise in monitoring firms that have received loans, banks are 
5 
 
also better positioned than other lenders to continue to monitor the borrowing firm ex post. 
Signalling models emphasize that if banks are superior monitors, and have access to 
proprietary information, they will only lend to companies considered creditworthy (Bernanke, 
1983; Fama, 1985). 
 Based on these theoretical arguments, we expect that announcements of bank debt 
have a positive impact on the borrowing firm’s market value. Empirical evidence for US 
companies generally confirms this. Billett et al. (1995), James (1987), and Lee and Sharpe 
(2009) find a positive market reaction bank debt issuance. Supporting the US evidence, 
Fungáčová et al. (2015) find a positive market response to bank loans for European firms. 
Armitage (1995) examines syndicated loans for UK firms and finds no significant market 
response to loan announcements. Bailey et al. (2011) and Huang et al. (2012) find a negative 
market response in China, which they link to potential for expropriation of borrowed funds 
by large state investors.3 
Studies have almost uniformly reported little or no response to issues of public debt 
issuance (Hadlock and James, 2002; James, 1987; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). James 
(1987) finds that the market responds negatively to privately placed debt announcements, but 
Chandra and Nayar (2008) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) find a positive market response 
for privately placed debt. These results collectively show that the market reaction to bank 
loans is comparatively different to other sources of external debt financing. Therefore, in 
Hypothesis 1 we consider whether this result holds for a UK sample of debt issues: 
 
H1. The stock market response to bank loan announcements by UK companies is greater 
than for other sources of corporate debt. 
                                                          
3 A number of studies have also reported that the positive market response is restricted only to specific sub-
sections of empirical data sets. Fery et al. (2003) find that the market responds positively only to bank loan 
announcements published in the financial press. Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) illustrate that the positive 
response to bank loan announcements is restricted to only the smallest firms in their sample. 
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2.2. Syndicated versus bilateral bank loans 
In addition to the market response to announcements of different debt sources, we 
also examine the market response to both syndicated and bilateral bank debt. Bilateral and 
syndicated loans differ in at least two crucial ways that could drive a different market 
response to their announcement. 
 The first difference concerns the parties involved in the loan: a bilateral loan is an 
agreement between an individual borrower and an individual lender, whereas a syndicated 
loan involves a number of lenders and can be viewed as an intermediate borrowing source 
between traditional bilateral loans and public debt markets (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; 
Marshall et al., 2016; Sufi, 2007). The potential free rider problems created in a lending 
syndicate can restrict the monitoring benefits of bank debt to bilateral loans only. If lenders in 
syndicated loans have weaker incentives to monitor borrowing firms, the stock price reaction 
to syndicated loans will be lower in comparison to bilateral loans because lending syndicates 
are closer in structure to arms-length public debt contracts.  
The second difference is the overall value of the loan: given that there is only one 
lender in a bilateral lending agreement, bilateral loans tend to be for smaller amounts than 
syndicated loans. Syndication allows for diversification of risk within the lending syndicate 
and higher loan amounts overall. If loan size is correlated with the incentive to monitor, we 
argue that the market response will be higher for syndicated loans.  
Based on these differing predictions, in Hypothesis 2 we examine the market reaction 
to syndicated and bilateral bank loan announcements separately: 
 
H2. There is a difference in the stock market response to bilateral bank loans in comparison 
to syndicated bank loans. 
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2.3. The impact of the 2008 global financial crisis 
In Hypothesis 3, we examine the stock price response to debt issuance announcements 
surrounding the global financial crisis. The crisis provides us with an opportunity to examine 
whether the restricted access to bank credit during this period affected the announcement 
returns to different debt sources in the UK, particularly as firms have moved away from their 
previous strong reliance on bank financing. We specifically examine if the positive signal 
from bank debt financing remains during the financial crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis 
period and other borrowing sources during the crisis.  
In the years prior to the financial crisis, it was widely reported that banks operated 
with less stringent screening and monitoring standards due to a number of factors, including 
the increasing availability of private sector debt and the amount of competition in the banking 
system (Adrian et al., 2012; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2011).  However, the onset of the 
financial crisis incentivised banks to adopt more stringent screening and monitoring of 
borrowers as banks could no longer sell-on so called crisis loans in the secondary market due 
to market illiquidity.  
Consistent with banks lowering their monitoring efforts prior to the crisis 
(Purnanandam, 2011) and then intensifying their monitoring efforts during the crisis period 
(De Haas and Van Horen, 2010), Li and Ongena (2015) find positive returns to bank loan 
announcements between September 2007 and December 2009, but no significant market 
response to announcements between January 2005 and August 2007. This suggests that when 
firms have been able to secure bank funding during this period of restricted access, the 
market views the announcement as an endorsement of firm quality. 
Whether these results hold for the UK is an empirical issue we examine in the current 
paper. The UK economy suffered more difficulties than most other economies during the 
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financial crisis given the size of the banking sector in comparison to the overall economy. As 
with other banking systems, there has been clear evidence of poor prior lending decisions. 
We propose that the restricted credit availability and potentially onerous terms for credit 
granted post crisis can reduce or eliminate the positive market signal from bank lending post 
crisis. There is some empirical support for this argument in non-US markets. Fungáčová et al. 
(2015) find that the market response to European loan announcements made after May 2010 
is lower than those announcements made prior to the Eurozone crisis and Godlewski (2014) 
reports a negative market response to syndicated loans issued by French companies during 
the crisis period. Therefore, in our final hypothesis we consider if the financial crisis has had 
an impact on abnormal returns surrounding announcements of bank debt: 
 
H3. The stock price response to bank loan announcements by UK issuing companies is lower 
during the global financial crisis. 
 
3. Data and research method 
3.1. UK debt announcement data 
Our sample of announcements of straight corporate debt announcements is for all 
non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) from 2001 to 2013. For these 401 firms we hand collect announcements of public, 
bank, and privately placed issues through Nexis UK (covering national and regional 
newspapers and Regulatory News Service (RNS) announcements made by LSE firms) using 
the keywords on debt announcement used in Hadlock and James (2002).4 Private debt is only 
                                                          
4 Also we search on: “bond,” “bond issue,” “debt notes,” “line of credit,” “loan facility,” “working capital 
facility,” “private placement,” and “overdraft.” 
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classified as bank debt when the lender is clearly acknowledged as a bank (Johnson, 1997). If 
the debt is not clearly identified as from banks it is classified as privately placed debt.5 
From our original search we have a sample of 1,682 announcements of debt issues by 
337 different firms. We apply a number of filters that results in a final sample of 1,537 debt 
announcements consisting of 967 issues of bank debt (767 syndicated loans and 200 bilateral 
loans), 370 issues of public debt, and 200 issues of privately placed debt.6 
As our sample is obtained from the newspaper and RNS coverage collected by Nexis 
UK, one concern is whether this actually covers all UK debt announcements.  For example, 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) state that approximately three quarters of US bank loans are 
not publicised in the media. LSE firms are required to disclose information on material 
capital changes and these are reported in the RNS. However, what is considered material is 
subjective and if managers do not view the information to be price sensitive they will not 
disclose issues of private bank debt or other privately placed debt. Therefore to check we 
have as full a population of loans as possible for our sample firms, we cross-check our 
sample with a number of relevant financial databases. 
All UK public bond issues are disclosed to the market as issuing firms must apply to 
the London Stock Exchange and the UK Listing Authority. Therefore we check our sample of 
370 announced public bonds with information from Thomson ONE and DataStream. We find 
no new public bond announcements through these databases. We check our 943 bank loan 
announcements with the DealScan database. We find an additional 24 unannounced bank 
loan announcements from DealScan (97% similarity in the two samples) and therefore we 
have a final sample of 967 bank loans.7 Finally, we check our sample of 196 announced non-
                                                          
5 This approach may under-report the importance of bank debt and overstate the importance of privately placed 
debt. However, more than 75% of private debt announcements are classified as bank debt, suggesting that this 
categorization has not created a sizeable bias against identification of bank loans. 
6 85 announcements were removed as the debt announcement coincided with another major firm announcement 
and a further 60 announcements were eliminated due to missing share price data.   
7 Our initial Nexis UK sample contained only one loan that was not included on the DealScan database. 
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bank private loans against the Private Placement Letter database. There is an overlap of 98% 
for our sample and we add only 4 unannounced non-bank private loans to our sample, 
resulting in a final sample of 200.   
We are also reasonably confident that our sample of private bank and privately placed 
debt announcements comprises the population of loans, despite there being no legal 
requirement for companies to publicly disclose private borrowing agreements, for our sample 
for two reasons. First, our sample is comprised of the largest 350 companies on the LSE, 
information about these companies is scrutinised by analysts and reported in more detail than 
for smaller UK firms. Therefore, debt issues made by these companies are more likely to be 
covered in the financial press and picked up by Nexus UK coverage of newspapers, RNS 
announcements by firms, and by commercial data providers including DealScan. Second, in 
addition to the firms themselves disclosing price sensitive information, it is in the interests of 
lenders to disclose or advertise loans they have made to commercial data providers, so that 
the loans are represented in each lender’s league table rank. 
 
3.2. Control variables  
To control for confounding factors that may impact the market response to debt 
issuance announcements we also control for loan characteristics, lender characteristics, and 
firm characteristics at the financial year-end prior to the announcement. We discuss these 
variables here and we summarize definitions and data sources in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2.1. Loan characteristics 
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 Loan size. Shepherd et al. (2007) argue that lender monitoring incentives increase 
with loan size and as such lenders are likely to have stricter pre-loan diligence on larger loans 
than smaller loans.  Loan size is the value of the issued loan deflated to the year 2000 using 
consumer price inflation.  
Loan maturity. Maturity could impact on the market reaction to debt issues. Ho and 
Singer (1982) state that that long-term debt may be riskier than short-term debt because there 
is a greater likelihood of long term debt not being repaid in full. Moreover, Flannery (1986) 
argues that the maturity of the issued debt provides an indication of managerial opinion on 
firm value and earnings prospects. Loan maturity is a count of the number of years to 
maturity. 
Renewal status. Lummer and McConnell (1989) examine the market response to new 
loan announcements and loan renewals and find a positive market response to loan renewals 
only. This suggests that banks only gain access to inside information through a repeated 
lending relationship. Renewal status is measured as a dummy variable set equal to one for 
loans where the announcement states that the loan is a renewal, revision, renegotiation or 
extension of an existing credit agreement, and zero otherwise. 
Use of proceeds. The use of proceeds can impact the market reaction to security 
issues (Slovin et al., 2000). Therefore we use a dummy variable, Refinance, set equal to one 
for loans where the announcement notes that the stated use of proceeds is to refinance 
existing debt. Acquisition is a dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement notes that the stated use of proceeds is to finance acquisitions. Other is a 
dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the announcement notes an intended use of 
proceeds other than acquisition or debt refinancing. Unclassified is a dummy variable set 
equal to one for loans where the announcement does not provide a stated use of proceeds. 
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Use of proceeds is not mutually exclusive and firms do state more than one reason for their 
debt issuance in some cases. 
 
3.2.2. Firm characteristics 
 Firm size. Consistent with Fama’s (1985) notion that larger firms already operate 
under the scrutiny of numerous external monitors and/or bank’s being able to extract more 
information from smaller borrowers, Slovin et al. (1992) find no significant market response 
to loan announcements made by large companies, but a positive response to announcements 
made by smaller companies. This result is suggestive of loan announcements for smaller 
companies conveying more information than larger companies as they market knows less 
about the former. We measure Firm size as book value of total assets (£billions) deflated to 
the year 2000 using consumer price inflation. 
 Asset tangibility. The market reaction to a debt issue could be influenced by the level 
of tangible assets the firm has to offer as security on the loan (Denis and Mihov, 2003). We 
measure Asset tangibility as the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets.  
Firm age. We expect the age of the borrower firm can impact the market reaction to 
debt issuance under reputation based theories of access to credit (Diamond, 1991). We 
include Firm age as our measure of a borrower’s reputation in credit markets. Age is 
measured from the date of incorporation. 
 Leverage. The amount of existing debt in the firm’s capital structure could impact on 
the market reaction to new debt issues, especially in relation to bank debt. Hoshi et al. (1993) 
argue that there should be a positive relation between the use of bank debt and leverage 
because firms with higher leverage require the monitoring that banks provide as they are 
more likely to engage in risk shifting strategies and have less to lose from high risk 
investments that do not pay off. Easterwood and Kadapakkam (1991) argue that firms will 
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employ more private debt if they have greater leverage since the expected costs of financial 
distress are lower when debt can be more easily reorganised. Leverage is defined as book 
value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. 
Stock price performance. The market reaction to debt issues could also depend on the 
prior performance of the firm. Hadlock and James (2002) find that bank debt issuers are 
likely to have underperformed firms issuing public debt and equity. They attribute the 
positive stock price response to bank loan announcements as evidence of undervaluation. We 
measure Stock price performance as the daily buy-and-hold return over the firm’s accounting 
year minus the return on the FTSE 350 index over the same time period.  
 
3.2.3. Lender reputation characteristics 
UK lender. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) find that local banks have an advantage 
over more remote competitors in the collection of soft proprietary information for 
monitoring. Therefore, we examine lender nationality to investigate whether UK banks are 
better informed than their foreign counterparts. UK lender is a dummy variable set equal to 
one for loans where the lending bank's headquarters are located in the UK, and zero 
otherwise. For syndicated loans we focus on the headquarter location of the lead arranger. 
Lender bailout. Prior to the financial crisis there is evidence that banks were not 
adopting high standards of monitoring and made bad lending decisions (Carbo-Valverde et al. 
2011; Purnanandam, 2011). Following the crisis, the UK government provided a bank rescue 
package to the value of £500bn to support struggling banks and to reassure the stock market 
that UK banks would survive. To examine the reputation of the lending bank we define 
Lender bailout as a dummy variable equal to one for loans where the lending bank received a 
government bailout during the financial crisis, and zero otherwise. 
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Lender credit rating. Billet et al. (1995) find that the stock market response to bank 
loan announcements is increasing with a firm’s bond rating. For example, they find a positive 
market response to loans from lenders rated Aaa by Moody’s but no evidence of a market 
response to lenders rated below Baa.  Lender credit rating is a dummy variable set equal to 
one for loans where the lending bank had a S&P credit rating of AA or above at the time of 
the loan agreement, and zero otherwise.8 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample of announcements of debt issuance by 
type. The apparent limited use of privately placed debt suggests that companies prefer to 
borrow from the main public bond market and bank debt sources, and limit their issues of 
privately placed debt to specific circumstances (Denis and Mihov, 2003).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 also presents the annual distribution of loan announcements in the sample. 
Issues of public and privately placed debt are less frequent as the economy enters the 
financial crisis. In contrast, we find that issues of bilateral bank debt increase towards the end 
of our sample period. This suggests that for our sample of large firms, banking relationships 
became more important during the period of credit constraints in the wider economy. The 
widely documented decline in bank lending following the financial crisis appears to be driven 
by a reduction in the availability of syndicated, rather than bilateral, bank loans for our 
sample firms. 
                                                          
8 Our results are unchanged if we split high reputation lenders as those with a credit rating of A and above, 
following Billet et al. (1995). However, there are only 12 loans in our sample made by lenders with less than an 
A rating from S&P. 
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We present summary statistics for loan and firm characteristics for each borrowing 
source in Table 3.  Diamond’s (1991) reputation building theory can explain variations in 
firm characteristics across different borrowing sources. Issuers of both syndicated and 
bilateral bank debt are typically younger and smaller than issuers of public debt. The average 
firm that issues bank debt is incorporated for 42.05 years with book assets of £3.91 billion, 
compared to 49.25 years and £13.14 billion for public debt issuers. Privately placed debt 
issuers are older, but smaller, than firms that issue bank debt.  
Companies using privately placed debt have the lowest levels of tangible assets to 
offer as collateral against their loans, and are likely forced to borrow in private debt markets 
because they have likely been screened out of borrowing in the public debt market (Denis and 
Mihov, 2003).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 The average bank loan is £397 million, which is almost one and a half times larger 
than the average public bond issue (£278 million) and over four times greater than the 
average issue of privately placed debt (£97 million). Confirming the importance of separately 
examining the market response to bilateral and syndicated loans, the average syndicated loan 
(£447 million) is considerably larger than the average bilateral loan (£212 million). This 
further highlights the importance of the UK context to our study, where syndicated loans 
have been shown to act as a hybrid step between bank lending and public bond issues 
(Marshall et al., 2016). If lender certification and monitoring is a function of the amount 
borrowed, we expect a more positive response to syndicated loan announcements in 
comparison to bilateral loans. Syndicated borrowers have fewer assets than public bond 
issuers but make use of multiple lenders to raise larger amounts of debt.  
16 
 
Consistent with prior US studies (see Arena, 2011; Denis and Mihov, 2003), the 
average bond has a maturity of 12.58 years, which is three times the maturity of a typical 
bank loan. Privately placed debt is issued for average maturities between these two other 
sources, with a mean of 8.75 years. Syndicated and bilateral bank loans have similar 
maturities, with an average of four years, suggesting that maturity is unlikely to be a factor to 
explain differences in the stock price response to these announcements (see Preece and 
Mullineaux, 1996).9 
 
3.4. Event study  
We use the standard market model to estimate abnormal returns with an estimation 
period of 170 days (-200 to -31 days) relative to announcements of debt issuance. The market 
model is defined as: 
 
                                                𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽𝑖𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑡)                                                      (1) 
 
where, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are OLS estimates of firm i’s market model parameters, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡, the 
benchmark index, is the return on the FTSE-350 market index in period t. 
The announcement date, day 0, is the date of the first public announcement of the 
borrowing agreement or debt offering in the press.  
The daily abnormal return is defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                  (2) 
 
                                                          
9 To check that the presence of outliers or skewness in the data does not drive our results we winsorize the top 
and bottom 10% of all observations for our control variables and replace the values below (above) the 10% 
quantile (90% quantile) by the 10% (90%) quantile values of the variable’s distribution and re-run our OLS 
regressions. Our empirical results are robust to the exclusion of outliers. 
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where, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on security i over period t, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are OLS estimates of firm i’s 
market model parameters, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the FTSE 350 market index in period t. 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a three-day window [-1, +1] 
surrounding the announcement to capture any information leakage or delay in response to the 
announcement: 
 



T
t
itiT ARCAR
1
                                                                          (3) 
 
Finally we assess the significance of CARs using standard Student’s t-tests calculated as: 
 
                     𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅𝜏,𝑇 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝜏,𝑇 
𝜎𝑡/√𝑁
                                        (4)                                                                                                  
 
where, N is the number of observations over the period which the CAR is calculated, and 𝜎𝑡 
is the standard deviation of abnormal returns over the estimation period. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Market reaction to public, bank, and privately placed loan announcements 
The univariate analysis of loan announcement abnormal returns is presented in Panel 
A of Table 4. Consistent with the US studies including Johnson (1995) and Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), we find no evidence of either a statistically or economically significant 
response to announcements of public debt. Similarly, the results indicate no significant 
market response to privately placed debt announcements. This is in contrast with James 
(1987), who finds a small negative response.  
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Consistent with the theory that bank loans can signal favourable information to the 
market, we find positive CARs of 0.56% surrounding bank loan announcements (significant 
at the 5% level). This result is comparable to the US studies of Billett et al. (1995) and James 
(1987), and the European analysis of Fungáčová et al. (2015). The positive stock market 
response for bank loans and insignificant market response for both public debt and privately 
placed debt provides support for our Hypothesis 1.  
This is consistent with Fama’s (1985) view of banks being able to obtain otherwise 
private information on borrower creditworthiness that can be used to monitor and improve 
corporate decision making at borrowing firms. Our finding provides preliminary evidence 
that banks are relationship lenders who are able to monitor borrowing firms. This is reflected 
in a positive stock price response to bank loans, both in absolute terms and with reference to 
alternative borrowing sources. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Given the notable differences in firm and loan characteristics between syndicated and 
bilateral bank loans in Table 3, we separately examine the stock market response to 
syndicated and bilateral loans to test our Hypothesis 2. We find that the positive market 
response to bank loans is driven by the sample of syndicated loans, where the average CAR is 
0.57% (significant at the 5% level). CARs are indistinguishable from zero for the sample of 
bilateral bank loan announcements. This provides initial support for Hypothesis 2 and is 
consistent with Focarelli et al. (2008), although contrasts with Armitage’s (1995) earlier UK 
results. We argue that the positive market response to syndicated loans reflects the benefits of 
lender monitoring by the syndicate lead arranger (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). The result 
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also reflects the size of syndicated loans and the signal of creditworthiness provided by the 
larger lending commitment.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we test for differences in mean CARs for bank and syndicated 
bank debt against public bonds and privately placed debt. CARs to announcements of 
privately placed loans are significantly lower relative to bank debt. This result holds 
irrespective of whether we examine all bank loans, or separately compare against both 
syndicated and bilateral loans. This is consistent with James (1987) and provides further 
support for Hypothesis 1. However, we find no significant difference between CARs for 
bilateral and syndicated loans, which fails to support Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.2. Impact of the global financial crisis on the market reaction to public, bank, and privately 
placed debt announcements 
To examine Hypothesis 3 on changes in abnormal returns to debt announcements 
surrounding the financial crisis, we follow Curcio et al. (2017) and define the start of the 
crisis as January 1st, 2008. Curcio et al. (2017) state that the financial crisis started in 2007 in 
the US and expanded into Europe in 2008. As our sample comprises loans issued by UK 
firms, from predominately UK or European headquartered banks, we follow this approach. 
Debt issues announced prior to January 2008 are defined as pre-crisis period loans. Debt 
issues announced after January 1st, 2008 are defined as crisis period loans. 
We provide preliminary evidence on the changing borrowing source for our sample 
firms in Figure 1, which reports year-end balance sheet debt outstanding for our sample firms 
across each of the three main debt sources that we consider. The figure clearly illustrates that 
UK firms’ use of bank debt has declined since the crisis. At the same time, the relative 
importance of both public and privately placed debt as a source of corporate borrowing has 
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increased. For those bank loans made since the crisis, there has been an increase in the 
relative importance of syndicated over bilateral bank lending (Bank of England, 2009, 2012).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the samples of public, bank (syndicated and 
bilateral), and privately placed debt issues in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Panel A reports 
loan characteristics between the two periods. We find that median loan size significantly 
increased and average loan size relative to total assets declined for public bonds during the 
crisis, but otherwise there is no difference in the size of loans or the proportion of new loans 
and loan renewals in the pre-crisis and crisis periods for any debt type.  
Average loan maturity is significantly lower in the crisis period for public bonds, 
syndicated loans and privately placed debt. During the crisis period, lenders appear to have 
increased their monitoring of borrowing firms by requiring that loans be rolled over with 
greater frequency (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Moreover, we find that the stated use of 
borrowed funds differs surrounding the crisis. Firms are less likely to borrow in order to 
refinance debt or for acquisition purposes in public bond markets or using syndicated loans 
during the crisis, and there is a notable increase in the relative popularity of other reasons 
being given as a rationale for debt issuance.  
 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Panel B reports differences in firm characteristics for borrowing firms over both 
periods. In the crisis period, the median issuer of public debt is larger than in the pre-crisis 
period and the median issuer of bank debt is smaller. Issuers of public and privately placed 
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debt have lower fixed asset ratios during the crisis. We interpret this is showing that large 
firms with weaker collateral made greater use of public markets when banks tightened 
lending criteria during the global financial crisis.  
We present announcement returns surrounding the crisis in Table 6. Similar to Table 
4, we find no evidence of a significant market response to issues of public bonds or privately 
placed debt in either the pre-crisis or crisis period. However, we do find a difference in the 
response to syndicated bank loan announcements. In the pre-crisis period, we find a positive 
market response of 1.04% to syndicated bank loans (significant at the 1% level), but in the 
crisis period, abnormal returns are indistinguishable from zero. We find no evidence of a 
significant stock price response to bilateral bank loans during either period.  
We formally examine the differences in CARs between the two periods in Panel C of 
Table 6 to test whether the market responded differently to debt issues surrounding the 
financial crisis. We find a significant decline in the market response to syndicated bank loans 
in the crisis period to the magnitude of -1.10% (significant at the 5% level), but there is no 
evidence of the market responding differently to public or privately placed debt during the 
crisis period. This supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that, in contrast to other borrowing 
sources, the financial crisis has had a significant and negative impact on stock market returns 
surrounding bank loan announcements. Our findings indicate that the previous positive signal 
provided by the monitoring mechanism of UK banks is less convincing to investors in the 
crisis period. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Our findings that bank loan announcement returns are lower during the crisis is 
consistent with Godlewski (2014), who reports a lower stock market response in his sample 
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of syndicated bank loans to French borrowing firms during the financial crisis. However, we 
do not believe that this result is necessarily suggestive of the benefits of bank loan financing 
having weakened over time, as proposed by Fields et al. (2006). Given the poor economic 
environment, it is possible that the lack of a positive market response to bank loan 
announcements during the crisis period reflects market awareness that borrowing firms have 
to meet onerous conditions, including high interest rates and restrictive covenants, to access 
bank lending during this period.  
Before proceeding, we examine the sensitivity of our findings to the definition of the 
global financial crisis period and split our crisis period into two shorter periods: 2008-2009 
(which we term as during-crisis period loans) and 2010-2013 (which we term as post-crisis 
period loans). We differentiate between these two periods for two reasons. First, it can be 
argued that the economic conditions surrounding loans announced between 2008-2009 and 
2010-2013 differ, and that the latter years reflect a post-crisis time period. Between Q2 2008 
and Q2 2009 the UK was in its deepest recession since WWII. However, in Q3 2009 the UK 
exited a formal recession and the London Stock Exchange staged a recovery from mid-2009 
onwards.  
Second, as illustrated in Table 2, the number of (syndicated) bank loans announced in 
2010 is significantly higher than in 2008 and 2009. This trend in our sample is supported by 
the Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey (2014) which suggests that after late 2009 
there was some relaxation in the tightness of credit conditions, particularly with reference to a 
marked improvement in credit spreads on loans to large firms making it more attractive and 
easier for these firms to access debt financing from banks than in the 2008-2009 during-crisis 
period sample period. Therefore, in Panels D to F of Table 6 we examine the market response 
to debt issues separated in these two shorter periods. We find no difference in the market 
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reaction for any of our debt types between these two sub-periods. Therefore, we proceed with 
our original pre-crisis and crisis period analysis.10 
 
4.3. Why is the information content of syndicated bank loans smaller during the financial 
crisis? 
Caprio (2005) argues that this distrust in banks is one of the greatest and unmeasured 
costs of any financial crisis. Following the global financial crisis, it is reasonable to surmise 
that there has been a widespread distrust of banks. An implication of this is that the reputation 
of the lending bank may be an important factor during the financial crisis period. In this 
section we extend our analysis of Hypothesis 3 to examine one potential channel through 
which the signalling benefits of bank debt change surrounding the financial crisis. We 
propose that lender reputation impacts upon the market response to issues of bank debt and 
that lender reputation has changed surrounding the financial crisis. We present the results of 
this testing in Table 7. 
We first examine if the location of the lender impacts upon the market response. 
Syndicated bank loans from UK lenders generate positive CARs of 0.69% (significant at the 
5% level). However, when the lending bank’s headquarters are located outside of the UK the 
market response is indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that for UK companies, banks 
headquartered in the UK are viewed as being better informed due to their close proximity to 
the borrowing company, which provides them with access to enhanced soft information on 
borrowing companies. This is consistent with Hauswald and Marquez (2005), who argue that 
there is an inverse relation between the distance between the lending bank and the borrowing 
company and the quality of the lending bank’s monitoring, screening and information 
gathering activities. Degryse and Ongena (2005) also find that banks charge engage in 
                                                          
10 In further testing, we split our sample by intended use of proceeds and renewal status of the loan. We find no 
significant evidence that the market reaction to loan announcements conditioned on these criteria has varied 
surrounding the financial crisis. 
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“spatial price discrimination” and increase loan rates with the distance between the borrowing 
company and the lending bank.   
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Next, we examine whether or not the market responds differently to loans where the 
lender received a government bailout during the crisis. Where the lending bank did not 
receive a bailout, we find a positive market response of 1.04% (significant at the 5% level). 
However, loans made by banks which did receive a government bailout generated no 
significant market response. This result suggests that even prior to the onset of the financial 
crisis, the market viewed these lending banks as potentially having less stringent credit and 
monitoring standards, and therefore receiving a loan from these banks was less of a positive 
signal of borrower creditworthiness. 
Finally, we investigate the whether the credit rating of the lending back has an impact 
on how the market responds to bank loan announcements. When the lender has an S&P credit 
rating of AA or above we find a positive market response of 0.89% for syndicated loans 
(significant at the 5% level), but we find no evidence of a significant market response to 
loans provided by lenders with a credit rating below AA. This is consistent with Billett et al. 
(1995). 
Overall, the results in this section highlight an important mechanism through which 
the positive signal of borrower creditworthiness from bank lending has reduced surrounding 
the financial crisis. Our results provide preliminary evidence that the reputation of the lending 
bank is an important determinant on how the market responds to syndicated loan 
announcements. We examine this issue in more detail in the next section after controlling for 
loan and firm characteristics. 
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4.4. Multivariate analysis of debt issuance announcements surrounding the financial crisis 
The univariate results presented in Tables 6 and 7 show a decline in the market 
response to syndicated bank loans during the financial crisis, but no evidence of the market 
responding differently to public and privately placed debt. The univariate results assume that 
the market’s response to debt announcements is influenced by only the type of lender and by 
economic conditions surrounding the announcement. Prior studies have also noted that 
borrower and loan characteristics can influence the market reaction to debt issuance 
announcements. Therefore, we estimate OLS regressions of announcement CARs against our 
key financial crisis variable (Crisis) and control for borrowing firm and loan characteristics. 
We present regressions of event study CARs for each borrowing source in Table 8. 
Consistent with our previous findings, Models 1 and 5 show no change in the stock 
price response to public bond and privately placed debt announcements respectively 
surrounding the global financial crisis. The insignificant F-statistic and individual regression 
coefficients highlights that our explanatory variables are unable to explain event study CARs 
surrounding loan announcements from these borrowing sources.  
 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
We confirm in Model 2 that abnormal returns are significantly lower for bank loan 
announcements made during the global financial crisis, after controlling for firm 
characteristics known to affect the borrowing source decision (Denis and Mihov, 2003; 
Johnson, 1997). The coefficient on our crisis dummy highlights that returns are 0.99% lower 
during the crisis (significant at the 5% level). We separately examine syndicated and bilateral 
loans in Models 3 and 4 respectively. In Model 3 abnormal returns surrounding syndicated 
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loan announcements are 1.40% lower during the crisis (significant at the 1% level). We find 
no significant change in the stock price response to bilateral loans surrounding the crisis. For 
control variables, we find a negative relation between firm size and abnormal returns for the 
sample of syndicated loan announcements.  
Our results provide preliminary evidence that the positive signal from bank loans has 
reduced significantly during the financial crisis. To rule out alternative explanations related to 
changing loan characteristics surrounding the crisis and to examine the potential channel 
through which the positive signal from bank lending is reduced, we focus only on syndicated 
loans and add additional control variables for loan and lender characteristics in Table 9. In 
each case, the crisis coefficient remains significant and negative at the 5% level or better. The 
coefficient ranges from -1.06% to -1.51%, confirming the robustness of our finding that stock 
prices of borrowing firms respond less positively to the announcement of syndicated bank 
loans during the financial crisis. This provides additional support for our Hypothesis 3, the 
general trend documented in Fields et al. (2006), and the financial crisis results of Godlewski 
(2014) for syndicated loan announcements by French borrowing firms.11  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
We extend the OLS regressions in Table 9 to include interaction effects between 
lender characteristics and the crisis period in Table 10. We find no evidence in Models 1 or 3 
that the headquarter location or credit rating of the lender bank interacts with the financial 
crisis to affect the stock market response to syndicated loan announcements.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
                                                          
11 In further testing, we examine interaction effects between the Crisis dummy and both firm and loan 
characteristics. We find no evidence of a significant interaction effect to suggest that specific firm or loan 
characteristics drive the changing stock price response to syndicated loan announcements surrounding the crisis. 
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In Model 2, the co-efficient for both the crisis variable and the lender bailout dummy 
are significant and negative, and the interaction between the variables is significantly positive 
(all significant at the 1% level). We interpret this as showing that the market viewed loans 
from banks which had been bailed out during the global financial crisis less positively prior 
to the crisis, and that generally loans made during the crisis are viewed less positively by 
stock market investors. Under the theory that bank loans signal borrower creditworthiness, 
the positive interaction term shows an expected improvement in lender monitoring during the 
crisis for those banks receiving government bailouts. The lower stock price response to 
syndicated loans during the crisis period is less for loans provided by bailed out banks. This 
also supports the view that bailed out banks were poor monitors prior to the crisis 
(Purnanandam, 2011). 
The results in Tables 8 to 10 show that the positive signal from syndicated bank loans 
was reduced surrounding the financial crisis. We extend our testing to analyse if the market 
reaction to syndicated loans has also changed relative to other sources of debt financing. 
Although we find no evidence of a significant decline in the stock price response to public 
bond and privately placed debt issues, we formally examine if the change in the stock price 
response to bank loan announcements is different to the reaction to announcements for 
alternative sources of debt financing. To do so we estimate regressions of event study CARs 
separately for pre-crisis and crisis periods. We include dummy variables for each borrowing 
source type to test differences in the market reaction to loan announcements for the pre-crisis 
and crisis sub-samples. 
We present these results in Table 11. Odd numbered columns present regressions for 
the pre-crisis period and even numbered columns present crisis period regressions. In Models 
1 and 2, we include dummies for public bonds and privately placed debt against the omitted 
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group of bank loans. We find that returns are significantly lower for privately placed debt 
issues only for the pre-crisis period. During the crisis, privately placed debt issuance is no 
less special than other forms of private debt issuance. This finding is robust to separately 
analysing syndicated and bilateral loans in Models 3 and 4. Our results in Model 3 provide 
partial support for Hypothesis 2, where returns to bilateral loan announcements are 
significantly lower in comparison to the omitted syndicated loans sample during the pre-crisis 
period. We attribute this to syndicated loans providing monitoring benefits through the lead 
arranger and the additional scale available through pooled lending within the syndicate 
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). 
 
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
For illustration, we now change the omitted group of loans and include dummy 
variables for bank loans (Models 5 and 6) and bilateral and syndicated loans (Models 7 and 
8). This allows us to highlight the stock price response to bank loan announcements in 
comparison to the alternative financing choices we examine. In Model 5, we find that after 
controlling for firm characteristics, abnormal returns for the full sample of bank loan 
announcements are insignificantly different to those of public bonds and privately placed debt 
in the pre-crisis period, and this remains the case during the crisis. In Models 7 and 8, we find 
that returns are 0.59% higher for syndicated loans in the pre-crisis period (significant at the 
5% level), but in Model 8 syndicated loans are no longer different to other sources of debt 
financing during the financial crisis.  
Collectively, our findings in this section provide strong support for each of the main 
hypotheses examined in this paper. For the full sample, we find support for prior US evidence 
that bank loans are apparently “special” in comparison to alternative sources of borrowing. 
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Stock markets react significantly and positively to announcements of bank debt financing, 
and the sub-sample of syndicated loan announcements drive our results. Our findings suggest 
that borrowing firms benefit from monitoring by the lead arranger in a syndicated loan and 
from the certification of being able to borrow relatively larger amounts of capital. However, 
we find a significant decline in the stock price response to syndicated loan announcements 
during the global financial crisis to the extent that abnormal returns to syndicated loan 
announcements are statistically indistinguishable from returns to other sources of debt 
financing.12  
 
5. Alternative event windows 
We employ some further testing to confirm the robustness of our results. To examine 
the robustness of our univariate event study results to the use of the market-adjusted model 
for estimating abnormal returns and to control for potential information leakage prior to the 
borrowing announcements, in Table 12 we estimate abnormal returns using the both the 
market model and market-adjusted model over a two-day event window (-1,0) and an 
alternative three-day event window (-2,0). Our results are robust to the alternative model and 
to alternative estimation windows. 
 [Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
A large body of literature has examined how stock markets respond to announcements 
of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance in the US. We extend this literature and 
examine the stock market response to announcements of debt issuance for a sample of 1,537 
                                                          
12 We repeat the regression analysis of Tables 8 to 11 using two-day (-1,0) and three-day (-2,0) market model 
abnormal return as the dependent variable to ensure and we examine the robustness of our results to the use of 
the market-adjusted model. Our empirical results remain robust to these tests. 
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announcements of public, bank and privately placed loans made by UK companies listed on 
the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange over the period 2000-2013. We 
contribute to the literature by separately analysing syndicated and bilateral bank loans, which 
we expect to elicit a different stock market response. In addition, we examine whether the 
recent financial crisis has an impact on how the market viewed the announcement of debt 
offerings from public, bank and privately placed sources.  
US studies have traditionally viewed bank loans as being “special” compared to other 
sources of external debt. Our initial results are consistent with this view. We find no evidence 
of a significant market reaction to public or privately placed debt announcements, but our 
event study results show that that the market responds significantly and positively to 
announcements of bank loans. When we investigate the differences between syndicated and 
bilateral loans, our findings suggest that syndicated loans drive the positive market response 
to bank loans and we find no evidence of a positive market reaction to bilateral loans. We 
interpret our results as showing that the market responds positively to syndicated bank loans 
where lenders benefit from the monitoring features of traditional bilateral loans and the 
ability to borrow larger amounts associated with borrowing in public debt markets. 
When we consider the implications of the global financial crisis on the market 
reaction to debt issues, we find lower announcement returns to bank loans made during the 
more constrained financial climate surrounding this period. The sub-sample of syndicated 
bank loans again drive our results. Prior to the crisis, abnormal returns to announcements of 
syndicated bank loans are significantly higher than for other borrowing sources and this 
relation is no longer present during the crisis. This reflects the damage to the reputation of 
bank lending as a consequence of poorer credit quality standards and thus poorer lending 
decisions in the pre-crisis period. 
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Our findings have a number of potential implications for lenders, borrowings firms, 
and market regulators. For lenders, if we attribute subsequent bails outs to poor lending 
decisions, our finding that stock market returns to bank loan announcements are different for 
those banks that subsequently received a bail out highlights that markets were aware of poor 
monitoring standards at the time of the loan announcement. Going forward, this suggests a 
role for individual lending banks to build a reputation for monitoring in much the same way 
as investment banks can build reputation in underwriting markets. From the borrower’s 
perspective, if one intention of bank borrowing is to signal to the market its willingness to be 
monitored then borrowers will choose amongst lenders based on their reputation in 
performing this role. If securitization of loans and lax lending standards leads to bank lending 
losing the “special” monitoring benefit identified in US academic literature then we also 
expect that companies will continue to expand their range of borrowing sources. For smaller 
and more constrained borrowers, we expect an increasingly important role for the privately 
placed debt in a firm’s capital structure.  
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Figure 1  
Existing Debt Mix 
 
This figure reports the existing debt mix for non-financial and non-utility companies whose shares were 
included in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange at any time during the period 2000-2012. Data 
on corporate borrowing from public, bank, and privately placed lenders is collected from the footnotes to the 
financial statements for each firm-year. Public leverage, bank leverage and private placement leverage are 
defined as the ratio of debt from each source divided by total debt outstanding.  
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Table 1 
Description of variables.  
Variable  Description Source 
Panel A: Debt announcements 
CRISIS 
A dummy variable set equal to 1 for announcements 
made on or after January 1st 2008, and zero otherwise.  
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
LOAN SIZE The amount borrowed. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
MATURITY The years to maturity of the loan. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
RENEWAL 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement states that the loan is a renewal, 
revision, renegotiation or extension of an existing 
credit agreement, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream, Nexis UK, Private 
Placement Letter and 
ThomsonOne 
REFINANCE 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement notes that the stated use of proceeds is 
to refinance existing debt, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
ACQUISITION 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement notes that the stated use of proceeds is 
to finance acquisitions, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
OTHER 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement notes the stated use of proceeds is not 
to refinance existing debt or to finance acquisitions, 
and zero otherwise. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
UNCLASSIFIED 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
announcement does not state the intended use of 
proceeds for the loan, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream, DealScan, Nexis 
UK, Private Placement Letter 
and ThomsonOne 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
ASSETS Book value of total assets in £bn. Worldscope 
FIXED ASSETS 
RATIO 
The ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to total 
assets.  
Worldscope 
FIRM AGE Number of years since incorporation. Worldscope 
LEVERAGE 
Book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets. 
Worldscope 
BHAR 
The daily buy-and-hold return over the firm’s 
accounting year minus the return on the FTSE-350 
index over the same time period. 
Worldscope 
 
Panel C: Lender Quality Characteristics 
UK LENDER 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
lending bank's headquarters are located in the UK, and 
zero otherwise. For syndicated loans we focus on the 
headquarter location of the lead arranger. 
Annual Reports, DealScan, 
Nexis UK, and ThomsonOne 
LENDER 
BAILOUT 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
lending bank received a government bailout during the 
financial crisis, and zero otherwise. 
National Audit Office (2011), 
Nexis UK 
LENDER CREDIT 
RATING 
A dummy variable set equal to one for loans where the 
lending bank had a S&P credit rating of AA or above 
at the time of the loan agreement, and zero otherwise. 
ThomsonOne 
The table reports variable definitions for debt and firm characteristics for our sample of loan announcements. 
Data is for 1,537 debt announcements for non-financial and non-utility companies whose shares were included 
in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange during the period 2000-2012. Debt announcements take 
place in the subsequent year. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of debt announcements over time.  
  Public Bonds        Bank Loans Syndicated Loans Bilateral Loans Privately placed Debt 
Year No.       % No.      % No.      %      No.       % No.      % 
2001 53 [14.32%] 49 [5.07%] 42 [5.48%] 7 [3.50%] 21 [10.50%] 
2002 41 [11.08%] 49 [5.07%] 43 [5.61%] 6 [3.00%] 22 [11.00%] 
2003 42 [11.35%] 64 [6.62%] 61 [7.95%] 3 [1.50%] 25 [12.50%] 
2004 42 [11.35%] 90 [9.31%] 80 [10.43%] 10 [5.00%] 12 [6.00%] 
2005 21 [5.68%] 105 [10.86%] 86 [11.21%] 19 [9.50%] 9 [4.50%] 
2006 38 [10.27%] 75 [7.76%] 67 [8.74%] 8 [4.00%] 21 [10.50%] 
2007 35 [9.46%] 74 [7.65%] 62 [8.08%] 12 [6.00%] 19 [9.50%] 
2008 31 [8.38%] 64 [6.62%] 48 [6.26%] 16 [8.00%] 16 [8.00%] 
2009 20 [5.41%] 58 [6.00%] 40 [5.22%] 18 [9.00%] 13 [6.50%] 
2010 10 [2.70%] 84 [8.69%] 66 [8.60%] 18 [9.00%] 14 [7.00%] 
2011 11 [2.97%] 117 [12.10%] 82 [10.69%] 35 [17.50%] 11 [5.50%] 
2012 15 [4.05%] 72 [7.45%] 45 [5.87%] 27 [13.50%] 9 [4.50%] 
2013 11 [2.97%] 66 [6.83%] 45 [5.87%] 21 [10.50%] 8 [4.00%] 
           
Pre-crisis period (2001-2007) 272 [73.51%] 506 [52.33%] 441 [57.50%] 65 [32.50%] 129 [64.50%] 
Crisis period (2008-2013) 98 [26.49%] 461 [47.67%] 326 [42.50%] 135 [67.50%] 71 [35.50%] 
Total 370 [100.00%] 967 [100.00%] 767 [100.00%] 200 [100.00%] 200 [100.00%] 
           
χ2 test that the proportion of debt announcements in the pre-crisis period is equal to the corresponding proportions in the crisis period on the assumption that loans are equally 
distributed annually. 
  81.83***  2.09  17.24***  24.50***  16.82*** 
    (0.0000)   (0.1480)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
The table reports the distribution [percentage] of debt announcements for our sample by debt source by year. Results are reported separately for issuance of public bonds, 
syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans, and privately placed debt. The pre-crisis period includes all debt announcements from 2001 to 2007. The crisis period includes all 
debt announcements from 2008 to 2013. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for debt announcements.  
      Public Bonds         Bank Loans        Syndicated Loans       Bilateral Loans Privately placed Debt 
 
No. Mean No. Mean No. Mean No. Mean No. Mean 
LOAN SIZE (£m) 350 277.80 872 397.20 686 447.39 186 212.10 185 96.99 
           LOAN SIZE / ASSETS 338 0.09 824 0.22 653 0.22 171 0.2 181 0.07 
           LOAN MATURITY 338 12.58 838 3.94 679 3.91 159 4.05 180 8.75 
           ASSETS (£bn) 365 13.14 953 3.91 757 3.36 196 6.03 199 2.86 
           FIXED ASSETS RATIO 362 0.35 942 0.3 746 0.3 196 0.3 198 0.25 
           FIRM AGE 361 49.25 934 42.05 742 43.47 192 36.55 199 48.46 
           LEVERAGE 365 4.52 952 16.15 756 16.08 196 16.45 199 3.42 
           BHAR 352 0.12 907 0.15 722 0.15 185 0.16 187 0.12 
The table reports summary statistics for our sample of loan announcements. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (%) surrounding debt announcements.  
 
Public Bonds Bank Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans 
Privately 
placed Debt 
Panel A: Univariate event study results 
Market model returns      
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.18 
(0.83) 
0.56 
(2.55)** 
0.57 
(2.35)** 
0.50 
(1.01) 
-0.16 
(-0.60) 
 [0.67] [2.74]*** [2.23]** [1.47] [-0.68] 
      
Market-adjusted model returns     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.29 
(1.32) 
0.65 
(2.98)*** 
0.69 
(2.82)*** 
0.52 
(1.05) 
0.13 
(0.50) 
 [1.63] [3.17]*** [2.58]** [1.65] [-0.87] 
Number of observations 370 967 767 200 200 
Panel B: T-statistics for difference in abnormal returns for different debt types 
 
Public Bonds Privately 
placed Debt 
Bilateral 
Loans 
  
Bank Loans 1.20 2.09**    
Syndicated Loans 1.18 2.04** 0.13   
The table reports three-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) centred on the announcement day, 
zero for a sample of debt announcements. Market model and market-adjusted model returns are estimated using 
a 170-day estimation window beginning on day –200 relative to the event day. The FTSE 350 index is used as 
the market benchmark for estimating CARs. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) corrected t-tests are presented in brackets. 
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Table 5 
Debt and borrower summary statistics.  
  
Public 
Bonds 
Bank 
Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans  
Privately 
placed 
Debt 
Panel A: Debt characteristics 
Pre-crisis period (2001-2007): 
Number of observations 272 506 441 65 129 
LOAN SIZE (£m) 277.26 419.52 453.24 187.15 90.82 
LOAN SIZE / ASSETS 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.07 
LOAN MATURITY 13.46 4.08 4.04 4.49 8.87 
Loan Status: 
     
- RENEWAL 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.01 
Use of Proceeds: 
     
- REFINANCING 0.28 0.44 0.46 0.32 0.22 
- ACQUISITION 0.07 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.02 
- OTHER 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.46 
- UNCLASSIFIED 0.60 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.38 
      
Crisis period (2008-2013): 
     
Number of observations 98 461 326 135 71 
LOAN SIZE (£m) 279.27 376.18 440.53 222.31 108.12 
LOAN SIZE / ASSETS 0.06*** 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.08 
LOAN MATURITY 10.22** 3.82** 3.77** 3.93 8.55** 
Loan Status: 
     
- RENEWAL 0.00 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.00 
Use of Proceeds: 
     
- REFINANCING 0.15*** 0.37** 0.35*** 0.39 0.13 
- ACQUISITION 0.02** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.16 0.01 
- OTHER 0.68*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.39*** 0.13*** 
- UNCLASSIFIED 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.73*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Pre-crisis period (2001-2007): 
ASSETS (£bn) 10.60 4.17 3.07 11.76 2.96 
FIXED ASSETS RATIO 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.28 
FIRM AGE 51.01 43.33 45.2 29.71 51.29 
LEVERAGE 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.31 
BHAR 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.30 0.12 
  
     
Crisis period (2008-2013): 
     
ASSETS (£bn) 20.05*** 3.62 3.77 3.19 2.67 
FIXED ASSETS RATIO 0.29*** 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.18*** 
FIRM AGE 44.10 40.61 41.05 39.82 43.24 
LEVERAGE 15.86** 33.76*** 37.67*** 24.48*** 9.14 
BHAR 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.09** 0.13 
            
Panel C: Lender quality characteristics 
Pre-crisis period (2001-2007): 
UK LENDER 
 
0.66 0.66 0.63 
 
LENDER BAILOUT 
 
0.51 0.51 0.55 
 
LENDER CREDIT RATING 
 
1 1 1 
 
      
Crisis period (2008-2013): 
     
UK LENDER 
 
0.63 0.63 0.63 
 
LENDER BAILOUT 
 
0.65*** 0.67*** 0.60 
 
LENDER CREDIT RATING   0.96*** 0.96*** 0.96   
The table reports mean summary statistics for loan and firm characteristics for our sample debt announcements. 
The stated use of loan proceeds is not mutually exclusive. The pre-crisis period includes all loan announcements 
from 2001 to 2007. The crisis period includes all loan announcements from 2008 to 2013. The sample and all 
variables are defined in Table 1. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively for 
the difference in sample means between the pre-crisis and crisis time periods for two-tailed t-tests of means.  
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Table 6 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (%) surrounding debt announcements.  
  
Public 
Bonds 
Bank 
Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans 
Privately 
placed 
Debt 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period (2001-2007) 
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.22 0.92 1.04 0.10 0.08 
(0.94) (3.71)*** (3.93)*** (0.14) (0.24) 
 [0.57] [2.94]*** [2.90]*** [0.54] [0.60] 
Number of observations 272 506 441 65 129 
  
     
Panel B: Crisis period (2008-2013) 
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.09 0.16 -0.06 0.69 -0.58 
(0.17) (0.43) (-0.14) (1.06) (-1.27) 
 [0.29] [0.98] [-0.18] [1.34] [-0.37] 
Number of observations 98 461 326 135 71 
  
     
Panel C: Difference in Crisis and Pre-crisis 
period  
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
-0.13 -0.76 -1.10 0.59 -0.65 
(-0.28) (-1.87) (-2.21)** (0.48) (-1.09) 
  
     
Panel D: During-crisis period (2008-2009) 
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.15 -0.05 -0.16 0.25 -1.22 
(0.15) (-0.04) (-0.12) (0.12) (-1.23) 
 [0.25] [-0.21] [-0.05] [0.27] [-0.09] 
Number of observations 47 122 88 34 29 
  
     
Panel E: Post-crisis period (2010-2013) 
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.02 0.25 0.00 0.84 -0.14 
(0.08) (0.85) (-0.01) (1.67) (-0.39) 
 [0.90] [1.13] [0.31] [1.48] [-0.40] 
Number of observations 51 339 238 101 42 
  
     
Panel F: Difference in During-crisis and Post-
crisis period  
     
CAAR (-1, +1) 
-0.13 0.30 0.16 0.59 1.08 
(-0.10) (0.18) (0.05) (0.39) (1.04) 
The table reports three-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) centred on the announcement day, 
zero  for a sample of debt announcements. Market model returns are estimated using a 170-day estimation 
window beginning on day –200 relative to the event day. The FTSE 350 index is used as the market benchmark 
for estimating CARs using the market model. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) corrected t-tests are presented in brackets. 
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Table 7 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (%) surrounding debt announcements.  
  
Bank 
Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans 
Panel A: UK Lender 
 
  
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.74** 0.69** 1.10 
(2.34) (1.96) (1.42) 
Number of observations 580 465 115 
  
   
Panel B: Foreign Lender 
   
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.13 0.26 -0.51 
(0.48) (0.84) (-0.77) 
Number of observations 314 249 65 
  
   
Panel C: Difference between UK and Foreign Lender 
   
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.61 0.43 1.60 
(1.44) (0.92) (1.58) 
  
   
Panel D: Lender bailout 
   
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.21 0.18  0.36 
(0.81) (0.64) (0.58) 
Number of observations 524 418 106 
  
   
Panel E: No Lender bailout 
 
 
 
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.97** 1.04** 0.74 
(2.37) (2.27) (0.75) 
Number of observations 370 296 74 
  
   
Panel F: Difference between Lender Bailout and No Lender 
Bailout    
CAAR (-1, +1) 
-0.76 -0.86 0.36 
(1.56) (1.61) (0.32) 
  
   
Panel G: Lender rated AA or above 
   
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.79** 0.89** 0.37 
(2.12) (2.28) (0.31) 
Number of observations 409 343 66 
  
  
` 
Panel H: Lender rated below AA 
   
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.19 -0.08 0.78 
(0.43) (-0.15) (1.02) 
Number of observations 248 173 75 
  
   
Panel I: Difference between Lender rated AA or above and 
below AA    
CAAR (-1, +1) 
0.60 0.97 -0.41 
(1.06) (1.49) (0.29) 
The table reports three-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) centred on the announcement day, 
zero for a sample of debt announcements. Market model returns are estimated using a 170-day estimation 
window beginning on day –200 relative to the event day. The FTSE 350 index is used as the market benchmark 
for estimating CARs using the market model. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8 
Difference in abnormal returns surrounding the financial crisis classified by borrowing source.  
Borrowing source Public Bonds Bank Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans 
Privately 
placed Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
0.0264 0.0952*** 0.1047*** 0.0671 0.0032 
(0.65) (3.40) (3.10) (1.56) (0.06) 
      
CRISIS 
-0.0008 -0.0099** -0.0140*** 0.0079 -0.0027 
(-0.11) (-2.183) (-2.70) (0.88) (-0.53) 
      
Ln TA 
-0.0015 -0.0040*** -0.0044*** -0.0030 -0.0001 
(-0.87) (-3.49) (-3.13) (-1.69) (-0.06) 
LEVERAGE 
0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
(0.00) (-1.56) (-1.33) (-1.14) (-0.77) 
FIXED ASSETS 
RATIO 
0.01168 -0.00294 0.0006 -0.0134 0.0013 
(1.30) (-0.40) (0.07) (-0.93) (0.11) 
Ln FIRM AGE 
0.0012 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0002 
(0.73) (0.06) (-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.10) 
BHAR 
-0.0001 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0048 0.0057 
(-0.01) (-1.06) (-0.84) (-0.81) (0.48) 
      
Number of 
observations 
340 871 694 177 185 
R-squared 0.0107 0.0166 0.0225 0.0149 0.0070 
F-statistic 1.19 2.65** 2.50** 1.02 0.33 
The table reports OLS regressions of abnormal returns surrounding debt announcements. The dependent 
variable is the three-day market model abnormal return centred on the announcement day, zero. The sample and 
all variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics for standard errors clustered by issuing firm are reported in 
parenthesis. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.   
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Table 9 
Difference in abnormal returns surrounding the financial crisis controlling for borrowing firm, lender quality and loan characteristics.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 
0.0973 0.0882*** 0.1031*** 0.0985*** 0.1032*** 0.1117*** 0.1044*** 0.1319** 
(1.61) (2.72) (3.05) (2.89) (3.07) (3.18) (2.86) (2.51) 
         
CRISIS 
-0.0112** -0.0106** -0.0143*** -0.0128** -0.0143*** -0.0151*** -0.0142** -0.0154 
(-2.30) (-2.10) (-2.72) (-2.52) (-2.69) (-2.75) (-2.40) (-1.27) 
         
Ln TA 
-0.0042 -0.0038*** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** -0.0046*** -0.0042*** -0.0055** 
(-1.79) (-2.86) (-3.09) (-3.03) (-2.97) (-3.05) (-2.86) (-2.45) 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(-3.81) (-1.22) (-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.32) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-1.48) 
FIXED ASSETS RATIO 
-0.0036 -0.0057 0.0004 0.0021 0.0003 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0004 
(-0.45) (-0.66) (0.05) (0.26) (0.04) (0.16) (-0.10) (-0.04) 
Ln FIRM AGE 
0.001 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.34) (0.25) (-0.04) (0.02) (-0.04) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.07) 
BHAR 
-0.0079 -0.0014 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0131 
(-1.22) (-0.19) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-1.25) (-1.26) (-1.57) 
LOAN SIZE / ASSETS 
-0.0024 
    
  
 
(-0.12) 
    
   
LOAN MATURITY  
0.0000 
   
   
 
(0.02) 
   
   
RENEWAL   
0.0056 
  
   
  
(0.87) 
  
   
ACQUISITION    
0.0094 
 
   
   
(1.60) 
 
   
REFINANCE DEBT     
-0.0062 
   
    
(-1.15) 
   
UK LENDER      
-0.0038 
  
     
(-0.72) 
  
LENDER BAIL OUT      
 
-0.0046 
 
     
 
(-0.79) 
 LENDER CREDIT 
RATING 
     
  
-0.0004 
     
  
(-0.04) 
Number of observations 618 620 694 694 694 655 655 464 
R-squared 0.0229 0.0157 0.0233 0.0254 0.0246 0.0261 0.0266 0.0331 
F-statistic 43.31*** 1.78 2.14** 2.46** 2.14** 2.16 2.49** 1.93 
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The table reports OLS regressions of abnormal returns surrounding loan announcements. The dependent variable is the three-day market model abnormal return centred on 
the announcement day, zero. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics for standard errors clustered by issuing firm are reported in parenthesis. *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.   
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Table 10 
Difference in abnormal returns surrounding the financial crisis controlling for the interaction effects between 
lender characteristics and the crisis period.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
0.0964*** 0.1005*** 0.1255** 
(3.13) (2.99) (2.33) 
       
CRISIS 
-0.0100 -0.0330*** -0.0095 
(-1.50) (-2.78) (-1.14) 
       
Ln TA 
-0.0041*** -0.0037** -0.0055** 
(-3.07) (-2.21) (-2.42) 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(-1.43) (-1.22) (-1.47) 
FIXED ASSETS RATIO 
0.0009 0.0003 -0.0005 
(0.23) (0.13) (-0.05) 
Ln FIRM AGE 
0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0003 
(-0.11) (-0.49) (-0.08) 
BHAR 
-0.0065 -0.0060 -0.0127 
(-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.56) 
UK LENDER 
0.0008 
 
 
(-0.07) 
  
UK LENDER * CRISIS 
-0.0076 
  (-0.80) 
  
LENDER BAIL OUT 
 
-0.0149*** 
 
 
(-3.30) 
 
LENDER BAIL OUT * CRISIS 
 
0.0306*** 
 
 
(3.25) 
 
LENDER CREDIT RATING 
  
0.0053 
  
(0.68) 
LENDER CREDIT RATING * CRISIS 
  
-0.0072 
  
(-0.54) 
  
   Number of observations 655 655 464 
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.03 
F-statistic 1.91 2.35** 1.77 
The table reports OLS regressions of abnormal returns surrounding loan announcements. The dependent 
variable is the three-day market model abnormal return centred on the announcement day, zero. The sample and 
all variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics for standard errors clustered by issuing firm are reported in 
parenthesis. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.   
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Table 11 
Difference in abnormal returns surrounding the financial crisis across borrowing source.  
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 
0.1047*** 0.0411 0.1081*** 0.0369 0.0954*** 0.0390 0.0971*** 0.0370 
(3.35) (1.20) (3.46) (1.06) (3.12) (1.15) (3.19) (1.09) 
         
BOND 
-0.0022 0.0039 -0.0039 0.0060     
(-0.71) (0.53) (-1.25) (0.78)     
PRIVATE 
PLACEMENT 
-0.0079** -0.0020 -0.0096** 0.0002     
(-1.97) (-0.44) (-2.34) (0.04)     
BANK 
    0.0042 -0.0012   
    (1.50) (-0.23)   
BILAT 
  -0.0144** 0.0075   -0.0085 0.0042 
  (-2.55) (0.98)   (-1.52) (0.55) 
SYND 
      0.0059** -0.0034 
      (2.03) (-0.61) 
         
Ln TA 
-0.0046*** -0.0020 -0.0047*** -0.0019 -0.0044*** -0.0019 -0.0044*** -0.0018 
(-3.48) (-1.53) (-3.54) (-1.45) (-3.42) (-1.46) (-3.47) (-1.38) 
LEVERAGE 
0.0045 -0.0000 0.0043 -0.0000 0.0047 -0.0000 0.0045 -0.0000 
(0.82) (-0.77) (0.79) (-0.71) (0.87) (-0.72) (0.84) (-0.65) 
FIXED ASSETS 
RATIO 
0.0026 -0.0018 0.0029 -0.0014 0.0032 -0.0010 0.0035 -0.0006 
(0.47) (-0.16) (0.53) (-0.13) (0.58) (-0.09) (0.64) (-0.06) 
Ln FIRM AGE 
0.0002 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0004 
(0.14) (0.15) (-0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (-0.17) (0.11) 
BHAR 
-0.0056 -0.0012 -0.0052 -0.0010 -0.0055 -0.0012 -0.0052 -0.0010 
(-1.22) (-0.21) (-1.13) (-0.17) (-1.21) (-0.21) (-1.12) (-0.17) 
Number of observations 835 561 835 561 835 561 835 561 
R-squared 0.0300 0.0026 0.0360 0.0043 0.0285 0.0022 0.0346 0.0039 
F-statistic 2.81*** 0.45 2.95*** 0.51 3.33*** 0.41 3.41*** 0.50 
The table reports OLS regressions of abnormal returns surrounding loan announcements. The dependent variable is the three-day market model abnormal return centred on 
the announcement day, zero. BOND is a dummy variable set equal to one where the borrowing source is a public bond issue, and zero otherwise. PRIVATE PLACEMENT is 
a dummy variable set equal to one where the borrowing source is a private, non-bank lender. BANK is a dummy variable set equal to one where the borrowing source is a 
bank entity, and zero otherwise. SYND is a dummy variable set equal to one where the borrowing source is a multi-lender bank loan, and zero otherwise. BILAT is a dummy 
variable set equal to one where the borrowing source is a single lender bank loan. The sample and all remaining variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics for standard 
errors clustered by issuing firm are reported in parenthesis. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  
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Table 12 
Abnormal returns surrounding debt announcements across various event windows. 
  Public Bonds Bank Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans 
Bilateral 
Loans 
Privately Placed Debt 
Market model returns 
     
CAAR (-1, 0) 
0.19% 0.63% 0.65% 0.55% -0.07% 
(1.04) (3.36)*** (3.13)*** (1.28) (-0.31) 
[0.84] [3.08]*** [2.53]** [1.85] [-0.77] 
CAAR (-2, 0) 
0.04% 0.64% 0.75% 0.18% -0.33% 
(0.18) (2.93)*** (3.31)*** (0.30) (-0.83) 
                                           [0.24] [2.70]*** [2.67]*** [0.62] [-1.18] 
Market-adjusted model returns 
    
CAAR (-1, 0) 
0.24% 0.64% 0.69% 0.47% 0.01% 
(1.23) (3.46)*** (3.33)*** (1.10) (0.05) 
[1.63] [3.58]*** [2.91]*** [2.10]** [-0.70] 
CAAR (-2, 0) 
    
0.11% 0.67% 0.81% 0.09% -0.27% 
(0.54) (3.11)*** (3.63)*** (0.16) (-0.67) 
[0.90] [3.52]*** [3.12***] [1.44] [-1.06] 
      
Number of observations 370 967 767 200 200 
The table reports three-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) centred on the announcement day, 
zero for a sample of debt announcements. Market model and market-adjusted model returns are estimated using 
a 170-day estimation window beginning on day –200 relative to the event day. The FTSE 350 index is used as 
the market benchmark for estimating CARs. The sample and all variables are defined in Table 1. *** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) corrected t-tests are presented in brackets. 
 
